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Peter A. O'Flaherty Effective and Efficient Regulation of the
Matthew J. Clarke* Offshore Oil Industry: The 2001 White
Rose Public Review Process
Section 44(2)(b) of the provincial and federal Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Ac-
cord Implementation Acts provides for a public review of proposed developments
of petroleum resources as part of the existing regulatory approval process for the
Newfoundland Offshore Area. To date, public reviews have been conducted for three
offshore oil developments: Hibernia, Terra Nova and White Rose.
This paper examines the effectiveness and efficiency of the public review process for
the White Rose Project. The author concludes that the review process was effective
in successfully gathering public input and reporting this information to the CNOPB.
Despite CNOPB's failure to accept many of the report's recommendations, the review
process' recommendations regarding provincial benefits were tacitly accepted by the
project developer. Finally, the author argues that the process was efficient as it was
conducted in a timely manner and at a low cost relative to total pre-production costs.
Whether these same benefits would accrue to a smaller offshore project, however
remains in doubt.
L'alin6a 44(2)(b) de la Loi de mise en ceuvre de I'Accord atlantique Canada-Terre-
Neuve provinciale et f6d6rale pr6voit la tenue d'une enqu~te publique sur la mise
en valeur potentielle des ressources en hydrocarbures dans le cadre du processus
d'approbation r6glementaire existant pour la zone au large de Terre-Neuve. Jusqu'a
maintenant, des enqu~tes publiques ont 6t6 men6s pour trois projets extrac6tiers de
mise en valeur: Hibernia, Terra Nova et White Rose.
L'auteur examine I'efficacit6 et I'efficience du processus d'examen public dans le cas
du projet White Rose. II conclut que le processus d'examen a et6 un succes puisqu'il
a permis de recueillir des observations du public et d'en faire rapport a I'OCTNHE.
Malgr6 le refus de I'OCTNHE d'accepter beaucoup des recommandations du
rapport, les recommandations sur les avantages pour la province ont et6 acceptees
tacitement par le promoteur du projet. Enfin, I'auteur pretend que le processus a
ete efficient puisque I'examen a 6te mene en temps opportun et a peu de frais par
rapport au total des coots de pr6-production. On peut n6anmoins se demander si les
m6mes avantages seraient offerts dans le cadre de plus petits projets extrac6tiers.
Peter O'Flaherty, Partner, Goodland O'Flaherty, St. John's, NL, and Matthew Clarke, Articled
Clerk, Mclnnes Cooper, St. John's, NL.
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The current regulatory process for the approval of any proposed develop-
ment of petroleum resources in the Newfoundland offshore area is, not
surprisingly, a complex one. Although few will dispute that the existence
of such a regulatory process is necessary in the public interest, opinions
differ concerning its effectiveness and efficiency, particularly for the
future development of smaller fields. In addition, the federal nature of the
Canadian state and the unique management and revenue sharing regime
established under the Atlantic Accord add complexities to the process and
ensure that the debate will continue.
We propose in this paper to examine the effectiveness and efficiency
of one important aspect of the existing regulatory approval process for
the Newfoundland offshore area, namely the public review of proposed
developments carried out under the authority of section 44(2)(b) of
both the federal and provincial Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Ac-
cord Implementation Acts.' The public review process is intended to
elicit public input and to produce an independent advisory report for
1. Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c.
C-2 and the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3 [the Accord
Acts].
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consideration by the regulator, the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore
Petroleum Board (CNOPB), when it makes decisions on development
plan applications (DPAs). This paper examines the first ever review to
be conducted on a stand-alone basis, the public review of the White Rose
Development Plan Application in 2001.
This paper is primarily intended to address two issues: firstly, whether
the White Rose public review was effective, that is, whether it produced
the desired results under the legislation, and secondly, whether it was
conducted efficiently from the perspective of timing and cost. This has
led us to a consideration of the issue of provincial benefits, a topic that is
likely to remain controversial despite the efforts of the CNOPB to clarify
the regulatory approach in Decision 2001.01.2 We will therefore include
some brief observations concerning this issue in the aftermath of the
approval of the White Rose DPA and some observations on how the public
review process might be improved.
It is noteworthy that the White Rose DPA was the first development
application with a Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan submitted for
approval under the Accord Acts solely by the developer without a negoti-
ated benefits agreement with the two levels of government. It was also
the first project proposed and approved under the generic royalty regime
for the Newfoundland offshore. Finally, it was also the first project in
the Newfoundland offshore to have been effectively released from the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) process, without referral
to a review panel, following consideration of the Comprehensive Study
Report (CSR) by the responsible authorities and the federal Minister of
Environment. It was clearly an important regulatory application for the
Newfoundland offshore and provided a unique opportunity for the regula-
tor to consider a "clean" application. In retrospect, the White Rose project
has probably established an important precedent for future DPAs, particu-
larly in the areas of provincial benefits, the mode of development, and the
CEAA process.
2. Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, Decision 2001.01 (26 November 2001)
[Decision Report]. Under Section 5 of the CNOPB's Development Application Guidelines (Decem-
ber 1988), "[alpproval of a Benefits Plan is a pre-condition to the approval of a Development Plan."
Such a Benefits Plan should "describe the proponent's commitment to, and plans concerning, the
following:
" the employment of Canadians and, in particular, residents of the Province of Newfoundland and
Labrador during the project; and,
" the participation of Canadian and, in particular, Newfoundland businesses in the provision of
goods and services for the project." (Ibid., ch. 5).
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I. The White Rose Project
The White Rose field, discovered in 1988, is located in the White Rose
Significant Discovery Area (SDA) approximately 350 kilometers east of
the island portion of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador. The
White Rose SDA forms part of the Jeanne d'Arc Basin and is located near
the currently producing Terra Nova and Hibernia oil fields.
The White Rose Development Plan Application was a proposal to
exploit only the oil resources of the South Pool of the White Rose field,
estimated at approximately 230 million barrels of recoverable oil. The
DPA proposed that the oil resources be developed by means of subsea
wells and a floating production, storage and operating facility (FPSO) with
a peak production capacity of 100,000 barrels per day. The White Rose
SDA also contains the largest reserves of natural gas discovered to date
in the Newfoundland offshore area, but the DPA sought approval to defer
development of those resources.
3
The White Rose Project received regulatory approval in December,
2001 and project sanction in March, 2002. At present, capital costs are
estimated at CAD 2.35 billion with costs to first oil being close to CAD 2
billion. Full field operating costs will be in the order of CAD 2 billion over
the ten to fifteen year production life.4
II. The White Rose Public Review Process
The public review process under the Accord Acts was only one part of the
overall regulatory review process for the approval of the White Rose proj-
ect. The White Rose project was subject to review under both the Accord
Acts and the CEAA process. The entire regulatory process lasted fifteen
months, commencing with the filing of the Comprehensive Study Report
(CSR) with various responsible authorities under the CEAA process on
October 10, 2000. It concluded with the acceptance of the CNOPB
Decision Report by the responsible ministers under the Accord Acts on
December 19, 2001. The overall review process ultimately consisted of
three distinct paths - an environmental assessment under the CEAA in
the form of a CSR, an internal review by the regulator, the CNOPB, and a
public review of the White Rose DPA by a commissioner appointed under
the Accord Acts.' We are concerned in this paper with the third aspect of
3. "Report of the Public Review Commissioner for the White Rose Development Application",
H.M. Clarke, Commissioner (September 2001) at i, online: CNOPB <http://www.cnopb.nfnet.com/
env/fr.pdf>[Commissioner's Report].
4. Husky Energy, "White Rose Project - Upstream - East Coast Canada" (April 2003) at 2.
5. Commissioner's Report, supra note 3 at 2.
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the regulatory process, the public review which took place between March
16, 2001 and September 24, 2001, the date on which the Commissioner's
Report was forwarded to the CNOPB and the federal and provincial
ministers. The public review of the White Rose DPA was conducted by a
single commissioner, Herbert M. Clarke, pursuant to terms of reference
established under the provisions of the Accord Acts. A chronology of the
process follows.
On January 15, 2001 the White Rose DPA was filed with the CNOPB
by Husky Oil Operations Limited and Petro-Canada. The DPA, as
prescribed by the Accord Acts, contained the following:
" Volume I - Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan;
" Volume II - Development Plan;
* Volume III - Environment Impact Statement (Comprehensive
Study Part I (submitted to Federal Minister of Environment Octo-
ber 10, 2000));
* Social Economic Impact Statement (Comprehensive Study Part
II (submitted to Federal Minister of Environment October 10,
2000));
* Safety Plan and Concept Safety.6
The DPA was also buttressed by eighty-four Part II supporting docu-
ments. The CNOPB initially reviewed the DPA for completeness between
January 16 and March 16, 2001. Afterwards, the DPA was referred to the
Commissioner.
On January 29, 2001, the CNOPB appointed the Commissioner for
the public review process. His terms of reference stipulated that the re-
view cover all relevant aspects of the proposed potential development of
the White Rose significant discovery area including: human safety and
environmental protection considerations; general development approach;
and benefits accruing to the province and to Canada, with particular
regard to the requirements for a Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan. The
relevant terms of reference provided:
2. General
Subject to the requirements of these Terms of Reference and the Accord
Acts, the Commissioner will conduct a review of the Development Ap-
plication which will include:
6. Ibid. at 3.
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(a) considerations of human safety and environmental protection incor-
porated into the proposed design and operation of the Project;
(b) the general approach to the proposed and potential development and
exploitation of the petroleum resources within the White Rose Significant
Discovery Area; and
(c) resulting benefits that are expected to accrue to the Province of New-
foundland and Labrador and to Canada, having particular regard to the
requirements for a Canada-Newfoundland benefits plan.
4. Limitation
The Commissioner's mandate shall not include an examination of ques-
tions of energy policy, jurisdiction, the fiscal or royalty regime of govern-
ments, the division of revenues between the Government of Canada and
the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, or matters which go be-
yond the potential or proposed development of the White Rose Significant
Discovery Area.
7
On March 16, 2001, the DPA was referred to the Commissioner at the
conclusion of the completeness review conducted by the CNOPB. The
public review process formally commenced on that date.
The public review process provided two separate opportunities for the
public to make submissions to the Commissioner. Initially the public was
invited to make submissions on whether additional information should be
requested of the proponent by the Commissioner. Subsequently, during
the public hearing process, individuals and organizations were invited to
comment on the merits of the DPA. The first stage of the public review
process was completed on April 19, 2001, with five submissions being
received. As a result of this public input and the Commissioner's own
review of the DPA, the Commissioner requested certain additional infor-
mation from the developer on April 26, 2001, and received a response on
June 8, 2001.
On May 16, 2001, intervenor funding was announced for the purposes
of assisting in the provision of meaningful public input into the public
review process. On May 28, 2001, intervenor funding applications were
approved by a conmmittee established by the provincial Minister of Mines
and Energy.8
7. CNOPB, Terms of Reference for the Proposed White Rose Project Pubic Review (29 January
200 1) at 2-3 [Commissioner's Terms of Reference].
8. Commissioner's Report, supra note 3 at 4.
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On June 11, 2001, the federal Minister of Environment completed his
review of the Comprehensive Study Report. He referred it back to the
CNOPB as the lead responsible authority without referring it to a review
panel under section 29 of the CEAA. 9 On the same date, the Commissioner
gave a 30 day notice of the commencement of public hearings. The public
hearings were to allow individuals, organizations, and the general public
to comment on the merits of the information and conclusions contained in
the DPA.
From July 11-31, 2001, twelve public hearings were held at three
separate locations in the province. In total, thirty-five presentations were
received from twenty-nine individuals and organizations, and eighty-six
submission documents were received by the Commissioner prior to the
close of the public sessions. On September 24, 2001, the Commissioner's
Report was completed and submitted to the CNOPB. It comprised the
Commissioner's review of the White Rose DPA, the Commissioner's
forty recommendations, and all of the presentations made during the pub-
lic hearings in July, 2001.10
On November 28, 2001, Lloyd Matthews, Minister of Mines and
Energy, rose in the House of Assembly to announce that he, along with the
Honourable Ralph Goodale, Minister of Natural Resources, Canada, had
received the CNOPB Decision Report on the White Rose DPA filed by
Husky Oil in January 2001 and would respond to the Decision Report in
the next thirty days.1" On December 19, 2001, the Ministers accepted the
report and approved the White Rose DPA, subject to conditions.
III. What Was the Purpose of the Public Review Process?
The Accord Acts make specific legislative provision for a public review
process. Section 44 of the Accord Acts provides as follows:
Public review by the board
44. (1) Subject to a directive issued under subsection 42(1), the board
shall conduct a public review in relation to a potential development of a
pool or field unless the board is of the opinion that the public hearing is
not required on a ground the board considers to be in the public interest.
9. Decision Report, supra note 2 at 177-78.
10. Commissioner's Report, supra note 3 at i, 4.
11. Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Mines and Energy, Press Release (28 November
2001).
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44. (2) Where a public review is conducted in relation to a potential devel-
opment of a pool or field, the board may
(a) establish terms of reference and a timetable that will permit a com-
prehensive review of all aspects of the development, including those
within the authority of the Parliament of Canada or of the Legisla-
ture;
(b) appoint 1 or more commissioners and, where there is to be more than
1 commissioner, appoint as commissioners persons nominated by
each of the governments in recognition of the authority of ministers
of the Crown in right of Canada or of the province under an Act of
the Parliament of Canada or of the Legislature, other than this Act or
the federal Act, in relation to the development;
(c) where the potential development has been proposed to the board by
a person, require that person to submit and make available for pub-
lic distribution a preliminary development plan, an environmental
impact statement, a socioeconomic impact statement, a preliminary
Canada-Newfoundland benefits plan and other plans specified by the
board; and
(d) require the commissioners to hold public hearings in appropriate
locations in the province or elsewhere in Canada and report on those
hearings to the board, the federal minister and the provincial minis-
ter. 12
Pursuant to section 44(1), the current regulatory process applicable to
the Newfoundland offshore normally incorporates a public review of a
proposed development, at the developer's expense, before any approval is
granted. The CNOPB Development Application Guidelines make it clear
that the public review will be a comprehensive one and will generally
include a public hearing process, with the attendant time and expense of
such a process. In order to understand why such an involved process was
considered necessary by the legislators and why provincial benefits have
remained such an important focus of the process, it is necessary to com-
ment briefly on the modern regulatory approach in Canada and the histori-
cal context of the White Rose Project.
In Canada, it is generally accepted that regulation in the public inter-
est is enhanced through the involvement and input of affected groups and
individuals, including the general public. On the other hand, the courts
have consistently deferred to the expertise of regulators making decisions
12. Accord Acts, supra note 1, ss. 44(1), (2).
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within their core area of expertise and affected parties are routinely denied
input into regulatory decision-making through the judicial system. There-
fore, numerous federal and provincial regulatory statutes make specific
provision for the involvement of the public in the regulatory decision-
making process, often in a representative capacity and normally at the
expense of the regulated concern. In any case, because of the potentially
enormous economic and environmental ramifications of an offshore oil
development, it was inevitable that some form of public review process
would be deemed necessary. In addition, the technical subject matter of a
DPA ensures that such a process has to be comprehensive and detailed in
order to make it meaningful.
In the case of the Newfoundland offshore area a number of other
factors contribute to the establishment of a review process that is lengthy,
comprehensive and, in some senses, political. As a province, Newfound-
land and Labrador faces significant economic challenges in comparison to
most other regions of Canada. There is a widely held perception among
its people, not unlike that shared by many inhabitants of former European
colonies, that its history has been one of exploitation of its natural resourc-
es for the benefit of outsiders. That perception found fertile ground in the
struggle between the federal and provincial governments in the 1970s and
1980s over the ownership and control of the mineral resources of the con-
tinental shelf. It is noteworthy that in 1984, the Supreme Court of Canada
in the Newfoundland Offshore Reference case 3 confirmed that Canada, not
Newfoundland, possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the mineral rights on
the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea.
Notwithstanding the Newfoundland Offshore Reference ruling,
Newfoundland and Canada ultimately negotiated a joint management
and revenue sharing arrangement called the Atlantic Accord, signed on
February 11, 1985.14 In 1987 the Atlantic Accord was implemented by the
enactment of two pieces of reciprocal legislation: the Accord Acts, at both
the federal and provincial level.' 5 Pursuant to the legislation, the govern-
ments jointly established the independent board known as the Canada-
Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, which operates as the principal
regulator of companies seeking to explore for and develop resources in the
13. Reference re Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, [1984] 1
S.C.R. 86 [Newfoundland Offshore Reference].
14. The Atlantic Accord: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Management and
Revenue Sharing, February 11, 1985 [Atlantic Accord].
15. Accord Acts, supra note 1.
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Newfoundland offshore area.
One of the main purposes of the Atlantic Accord is "to recognize the
right of Newfoundland and Labrador to be the principal beneficiary of the
oil and gas resources off its shores, consistent with the requirement for a
strong and united Canada."' 16 While offshore oil and gas developments
have undoubtedly had a positive impact on the economy of the province,
particularly in the Avalon Peninsula, in 2002-2003 the province's fiscal
capacity per capita was still only 68.5 percent of the all-province na-
tional average. 7 Unfortunately, it appears that the promise of the Accord
that offshore oil and gas would become the engine of growth for a self-
sufficient Newfoundland and Labrador has proved largely illusory. As one
commentator recently stated:
Clearly Newfoundland is not the primary or principal beneficiary of the
offshore resources, nor of offshore revenues, but is a minor beneficiary
when compared to the federal government. The importance of this is that
unless the Atlantic Accord is honored and implemented as to its original
intent, Newfoundland is unlikely ever to become a self-sufficient prov-
ince within the Canadian federation.1 8
Within this historical context, the public pressure on the governments and
the regulator to deliver provincial benefits is significant. It is therefore
understandable that in the course of any public review of the White Rose
Project the Commissioner would be expected to consider public submis-
sions and make recommendations on whether the proposed development
would be likely to realize the policy objectives of the Atlantic Accord,
especially the generation of economics benefits for the province. The
Commissioner's terms of reference require that the public review include
consideration of "the resulting benefits that are expected to accrue to the
province of Newfoundland and Labrador and to Canada, having particular
regard to the requirements for a Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan."' 9
In conclusion, the White Rose public review process served two
purposes: firstly to gather public input on all aspects of the proposed
development, including the politically sensitive issue of provincial
16. Atlantic Accord, supra note 14 at s. 2(c).
17. John C. Crosbie, "Overview Paper on the 1985 Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord" (Paper
presented to the Royal Commission on Strengthening and Renewing Our Place in Canada, March
2003) [unpublished] at 279.
18. Ibid. at 277.
19. Commissioner's Terms of Reference, supra note 7 at s. 2 (c).
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benefits, and secondly to prepare an independent advisory report on the
proposed development for consideration by the CNOPB and the respon-
sible ministers in deciding whether or not to approve any development.
IV. Was the White Rose Public Review Process Effective?
The public review process served two main purposes: gathering public
input regarding the White Rose DPA and providing advice to the CNOPB
by means of a Commissioner's Report. How effective was the process
in carrying out these duties? We have concluded that the public review
process was clearly effective in gathering input from the public and in
reporting on that input to the CNOPB and the ministers. It was quite
ineffective in generating an independent advisory report which directly
impacted the area of provincial benefits. Ultimately, however, the process
itself resulted in an adequate response by the proponent.
1. Public Input
There was a significant level of public involvement in the White Rose
public review process. The public hearings were generally well attended
and there was a high level of media interest in the process. In total, twenty-
nine intervenors participated in the public hearing stage and thirty-five
presentations were made during the public review, most of which were
well-researched and balanced. The Commissioner received and reviewed
a total of eighty-six submissions, including many prepared spontaneously
by the developer in response to the needs of the process. Public input was
gathered on a wide range of issues, including the mode of development,
the potential impacts on the environment, and concerns about icebergs and
the fishery. Submissions were received from many important provincial
and national organizations including the Canadian Association of Petro-
leum Producers, the Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador,
the Newfoundland Offshore Industries Association, the Friends of Gas
Onshore, and the Fish, Food and Allied Workers Union.
Most submissions focused on the Canada-Newfoundland Benefits
Plan, as twenty-four of the thirty-five presentations considered by the
Commissioner were either wholly or partially concerned with the issue
of provincial benefits. The key single issue for the public was the discon-
nect between its understanding of the Accord and the delivery of benefits
resulting from the previous offshore oil and gas developments. The Com-
missioner summed up the essence of the public input this way:
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People want the White Rose project to go ahead under the right condi-
tions. However, they are frustrated with the level of benefits being real-
ized, in relation to the potential, and by the lack of a clear and acceptable
interpretation of the Atlantic Accord and the Accord Acts. They feel the
spirit and intent of the Atlantic Accord has been gradually eroding.
It appears to the Commissioner that, in a general sense, many of these
detailed concerns are really symptomatic of structural and administrative
problems with the current benefits system and that no one, including the
public, the supply and service organizations, trade unions, municipalities,
proponents or the regulator are particularly satisfied with the current cir-
cumstances. Changes in procedure and approach are required for White
Rose, for future projects, and for the industry generally.
20
Clearly, the Commissioner understood the public input to represent a call
for significant changes in the approach to provincial benefits. As a result,
many of the Commissioner's detailed recommendations were directed to
the benefits issue.
2. The Result of the Process
Following a comprehensive and costly public review process, an advisory
document was prepared by the Commissioner for consideration by the
CNOPB and the ministers. As the report stated:
The Commissioner's recommendations are designed to ensure that the
Project is developed in a safe and environmentally responsible manner
and with an acceptable level of benefits. The Commissioner's recommen-
dations in this report also provide certainty for investment and develop-
ment consistent with the competitive global environment in which the oil
industry operates, and more.
2 1
The Commissioner made eleven recommendations regarding the general
development approach, fourteen recommendations regarding benefits and
the Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan, and fifteen recommendations
regarding human safety and environmental protection. 22 In total, of the
forty recommendations made by the Commissioner, thirty-nine were made
20. Commissioner's Report, supra note 3 at vii.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. at 93-107.
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to the CNOPB. Of those, and allowing for some language differences
between the recommendations and the CNOPB responses, only fifteen
were partially or wholly adopted in the CNOPB's Decision Report, and the
remaining twenty-four were either ignored or specifically rejected.
The area in which the CNOPB most clearly rejected the recommenda-
tions of the Commissioner was on the topic of benefits and the Canada-
Newfoundland Benefits Plan. In the past, the CNOPB had approved
benefits plans that were in essence framework documents, prepared in
the context of negotiated benefits agreements. Unlike Hibernia or Terra
Nova, however, the White Rose DPA was "reviewed under [the] CNOPB
mandate and generic royalty regime with no pre-negotiated positions.
23
The Commissioner was not prepared to recommend approval of the pro-
posed Canada-Newfoundland Benefits Plan, characterizing it as an over-
qualified, general document with no firm goals or quantifiable objectives
for employment or for goods and services. He recommended that, rather
than approving a general, framework document, the CNOPB "require
specific and measurable objectives for benefits, and [to] thereafter moni-
tor the project to ensure compliance with those general commitments.
24
The CNOPB completely rejected this approach, taking the position that
the Board had no duty to "maximize" provincial benefits and that in fact
requiring "objectives" of the type recommended by the Commissioner in a
benefits plan was essentially ultra vires the Accord Acts.
Of course, as the regulator, the CNOPB was entitled to accept or reject
the Commissioner's advice and to adopt the approach it saw fit to the rele-
vant provisions of the Accord Acts. Indeed, most knowledgeable observers
would concede that it is possible to derive competing interpretations from
the language of the Accord and the Accord Acts. Unfortunately, however,
in the course of giving its interpretation, the CNOPB in its Decision Re-
port suggested that the Commissioner was recommending that the CNOPB
impose benefit "targets" on the developer and make the achievement of
such "targets" a condition of project approval. The following passage of
the Decision Report summarizes the manner in which the CNOPB under-
stood the Commissioner's recommendations on provincial benefits:
The Commissioner has made some recommendations in his report suggest-
ing the Board make certain benefit achievements a condition of approval
23. W. Roach, A. MacDonald & D. Black, White Rose Development Application, "Lessons Learned
from the White Rose Regulatory Proceedings" (2002) at 12, ["Lessons Learned"].
24. Commissioner's Report, supra note 3 at 45-46, 99.
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of the White Rose Benefits Plan. The Board has not done so. This should
not be interpreted as either disagreement or agreement on the Board's part
with these recommendations made by the Commissioner. The Board has
no authority to implement such recommendations. Therefore, this Ben-
efits Plan Decision has not addressed these recommendations; other than
to indicate where and how they fall outside the Legislation.25
This summary oversimplifies and effectively misunderstands the entire
approach to benefits recommended in the Commissioner's Report. In fact,
the Commissioner's Report stated as follows:
Both the Proponent and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Produc-
ers (CAPP) argued strenuously against specified goals or targets because
they believed such a system implies preference. The Proponent further
believes that prescriptive targets suggest that local business cannot be
competitive, are counter to building a local competitive industry and may
result in artificially high prices. The Commissioner would understand the
Proponent's concern if the targets were to be imposed in an arbitrary man-
ner by the regulator. Since this is not the intent nor has it ever been sug-
gested, it is difficult to see merit in these arguments. The targets are not
quotas as some observers immediately categorize them (perhaps for their
own purposes) but rather management tools to help all parties improve
performance in keeping with the intent of the Accord. The Proponent has
accepted the utility of targets in the area of safety. In the case of benefits,
their purpose is to increase Canada-Newfoundland benefits without com-
promising the basic interests of the Proponent.
The proponent should come up with its best specific estimates of what it
thinks it can achieve in terms of Canada-Newfoundland benefits "taking
everything into account", including industry capabilities and labour avail-
ability, the Proponent's own pro-active programs, and its discussions with
industry, labour and the regulator. The regulator, CNOPB, as part of the
Benefits Plan evaluation, would consider these targets and if approved
they would be used for monitoring purposes and to measure performance.
Targets can be adjusted up or down by the Proponent in consultation with
the CNOPB. For example, over the life of a project, target levels of em-
ployment might increase as capabilities of local labour and business in-
crease. Conversely, when unforeseen barriers are identified, targets might
be lowered or measures put in place to address these barriers. All partici-
pants would know the rules of the game as opposed to trying to second
guess a very generally worded and over qualified Benefits Plan.
25. Decision Report, supra note 2 at 13-14.
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Finally, a very important feature of such a system is that the Proponent
would retain flexibility and discretion on individual decisions (including
contracts) but would be responsible for achieving the overall aggregate
quantifiable objective in that particular area. It is on this basis that perfor-
mance will be monitored and reported by the CNOPB.
26
This misunderstanding by the CNOPB is symptomatic of the most obvious
weakness of the existing system, the lack of any direct participation in the
review process by the regulator. The CNOPB has taken the position that
it should not participate in the public review process, presumably in order
that the Commissioner's independence not be jeopardized. Realistically,
however, the regulatory process does not otherwise allow for the public
to formally engage with the regulator on any issue, including the issue of
provincial benefits. Indeed, there were a number of occasions during the
review process when members of the public directed specific criticisms
towards the absent CNOPB. As one commentator stated:
... it is vitally important for effective regulation that there be an on-going
dialogue between regulatory agencies, regulated companies and the pub-
lic. This is essential to the success of economic regulation which has to be
constantly evolving and adapting to new circumstances.27
Ultimately, it is noteworthy that Husky Energy did finally provide
information regarding "quantifiable objectives" prior to completion of the
Decision Report. On November 20, 2001, Husky wrote the federal and
provincial ministers to provide detailed tables containing "our most cur-
rent plans for employment and expenditures for the development phase
of the project" and "our best estimates and objectives for employment
levels" for the operations phase of the project.28 On November 23, 2001,
the provincial Minister of Mines and Energy requested that the CNOPB
"treat the plans, estimates and objectives provided therein as benchmarks,
recognizing that benchmarks are not ceilings. '29 He asked that the CNOPB
"incorporate as a condition of the Benefits Plan approval that it will moni-
tor the benchmarks against actual performance in assessing the success
of the Proponent's efforts to maximize achievements.... "3 The CNOPB
agreed subject to the following:
26. Commissioner's Report, supra note 3 at 53.
27. Hudson N. Janisch, Case Comment on Nfld. Light & Power Co. v. P.U.C. (Bd.) (1987) 25 Admin.
L.R. 196 at 200-201.
28. Decision Report, supra note 2 at 160.
29. Ibid. at 158.
30. Ibid.
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It is a condition of this Benefits Plan approval that the Proponent submit
on a quarterly basis during the construction and operations phases of the
Development a report describing its actual performance against the es-
timates provided in its correspondence contained in Appendix D of this
Report. Any deviation between the benchmarks of estimates, plans and
objectives and actual performance should be accompanied by explana-
tory notes in sufficient detail to allow assessment of the reasons for the
deviation.
3'
If one accepts that, in principle, the effective advisor is one whose advice
is followed, the number of recommendations ignored or rejected appears
to suggest that the report of the Public Review Commissioner for the
White Rose DPA was largely ineffective. In the final analysis, however,
the CNOPB appears to have tacitly accepted the establishment of "quan-
tifiable objectives" along the lines suggested by the Commissioner and to
have made monitoring of those "objectives" a condition of approval of the
DPA.
In conclusion, the White Rose public review process appears to have
been very effective in gathering public input and, despite the disconnect
between the Commissioner's Report and the Decision Report, was effec-
tive in influencing the decision-making process. Unfortunately, the public
review process provided no opportunity for the regulator and the public to
have a full and frank debate concerning the manner in which the CNOPB
interprets the Accord and the Accord Acts. It is suggested that the public
review process could be improved by giving the public an opportunity to
engage with the CNOPB on issues arising from proposed oil and gas de-
velopments, particularly because there is no satisfactory alternative forum
in which this debate can take place. This type of dialogue would have
probably improved the effectiveness of the public review process.
V. Was the White Rose Public Review Process Efficient?
The efficiency of the public review process can be objectively measured in
two ways, that is, in terms of time and in terms of cost. Was it too long?
Was it too expensive? From both perspectives, it is submitted that the
proper conclusion is that public review process was, overall, an efficient
one.
31. Ibid. at 36, Condition 11.
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1. Time Frame
The DPA was formally referred to the Commissioner for a public review
on March 16, 2001. On that date the Board issued the following state-
ment:
This marks the formal commencement of the Commissioner's activity
in providing the public an opportunity to examine the Development Ap-
plication and to comment on it through written submissions and oral pre-
sentations in public hearings. This activity is expected to be completed
within six months. In accordance with the Commissioner's terms of
reference, the Commissioner will operate independently from the Board
in this process, and will establish the schedule, locations and guidelines
for public hearings.
Meanwhile, the CNOPB will undertake its internal review of the Applica-
tion under the Accord Acts, and work will continue under the environ-
mental assessment under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.
32
The Commissioner immediately released a notice to the public advising of
the approximate dates during which the public sessions were expected to
take place and the procedures for participation in the public review pro-
cess. The time frames established with respect to requests for additional
information and the commencement and completion of sessions were
met.
Overall, the Commissioner's terms of reference required that the re-
port be submitted at the earliest possible date but in no event later than 180
days following receipt of the DPA. Ultimately, the report was submitted
on September 24, 2001, 192 days from receipt of the information referred
to in paragraph 8 of the Terms of Reference. The primary reason for the
brief delay was probably related to the timing of the release of the White
Rose Project from the environmental review process under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act. As noted by the developer, the overlap
between CEAA and the Accord Acts process created a "significant timing
uncertainty."33
In terms of overall project timing, at the time of the filing of the White
Rose DPA, on January 15, 2001, the owners were reported as having stated
that project sanction was expected in the fourth quarter of 2001 and first
32. CNOPB, News Release, "White Rose Development Application Referred to Commissioner for
Public Review" (16 March 2001).
33. "Lessons Learned", supra note 23 at 13.
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oil in the fourth quarter of 2004, "if the regulatory review process proceeds
as expected."34 The owners had established a project team in St. John's,
Newfoundland from 1998 to pursue a significant pre-contracting initiative
to meet this schedule. While this target for first oil will probably not be
achieved, there is no indication that the delay is related in any way to the
regulatory review process, and is probably related to construction delays
in, for example, the excavation of the glory holes. Finally, the fifteen-
month overall regulatory timing was not dissimilar to Hibernia (thirteen
months), Terra Nova or Sable (both seventeen months). It must therefore
be concluded, based on the close proximity between the proposed sched-
ule and the actual completion date, and considering the technical and
"political" nature of the subject matter, that the public review process was
conducted in an efficient manner from a timing standpoint.
2. Cost
The proponent estimated the costs of the regulatory process, including the
CEAA submission, at direct costs of CAD 2.9 million and total costs of
CAD 15-20 million.35 Of the direct costs, roughly 25 per cent has been
estimated to be the costs of the Commissioner in conducting the public
review process. In carrying out that review, the Commissioner retained the
services of the following consultants:
(1) Bevin R. LeDrew, AMEC Earth and Environmental (Environmental
Protection Section of the Commissioner's Report);
(2) John G. Fitzgerald, P.Eng (Request for additional information
stage);
(3) Patricia R. Jackson (Communications Planning; Media Relations
during public sessions);
(4) T.G. Whalen, P.Eng (Review of benefits issues);
(5) Richard G. De Wolf and G. Gordon Clarke, Ziff Energy Group (Re-
view of development plan issues);
(6) Patrick Martin, DRAY Inc. (Website design and maintenance).
3 6
34. Newfoundland Department of Mines and Energy, News Release, "Minister welcomes White
Rose Development Plan Application" (16 January 2001).
35. "Lessons Learned", supra note 23 at 7.
36. Commissioner's Report, supra note 3 at A-2.
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In addition, the public review commission secretariat consisted of a full-
time manager and an administrative assistant, as well as part-time com-
mission counsel, who were employed from approximately January 16,
2001, to September 24, 2001.
There is no question that the public review process was costly. The
costs must, however, be viewed in relation to pre-production costs of CAD
2.8 billion for Terra Nova and CAD 2 billion for White Rose.37 There are
no comparative regulatory costs from Hibernia, Terra Nova, and Sable.
The direct and indirect costs of the regulatory process do not, in context,
seem excessive. In fact, while overall costs of the public review were
significant, the actual budget for the single Commissioner for White Rose
seems very reasonable. Whether such a process is justifiable for smaller
developments is an open question, particularly because the mode of pro-
duction will almost certainly employ floating technology.
The position of the developer regarding the cost of the process was
summarized by Dr. William Roach, the General Manager, East Coast De-
velopment, for Husky Oil, who observed:
The White Rose regulatory process required significant effort in terms of
time, money and resources (and) is potentially onerous for smaller fields
particularly the future "tie backs."38
Overall, the process was probably efficient in terms of cost in relation to a
200-300 million barrel field. The same might hold true for a field even half
that size. It is not difficult to imagine, however, that there will be consider-
able pressure brought to bear on the regulator to scale back or eliminate
public reviews altogether for smaller projects or "tie backs" on the ground
that they would not be "in the public interest.
' 39
Conclusion
For the last word about the White Rose public review process one must
return to the issue of provincial benefits. The provincial Minister of Indus-
try, Trade and Rural Development, the Honourable Beaton Tulk, issued
the following statement on December 19, 2001, in response to his federal
colleague's acceptance of a Decision Report in which the CNOPB denied
37. Husky Energy, "East Coast Canada Upstream" (April 2003).
38. "Lessons Learned", supra note 23 at 14.
39. Accord Acts, supra note I, s. 44(l).
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any duty to "maximize" benefits and claimed that requiring firm plans or
objectives to be contained in a benefits plan was ultra vires the Accord
Acts:
Government has been working closely with the project proponent for
more than a year to ensure that provincial benefits from the development
of White Rose are maximized where we have the capability to participate
on a reasonable commercial basis. This was a common theme heard
throughout the public consultations on White Rose, and was echoed in the
Public Review Commissioner's report.
I am pleased to announce that we have gone a long way toward achiev-
ing that goal, with firm plans by the proponent to undertake within New-
foundland and Labrador in excess of 80 per cent of the development phase
work we can reasonably do in this province, and in excess of 80 per cent
of all production phase employment ...
The proponent has also committed to make every effort to improve upon
these levels of provincial participation, in keeping with the spirit and
intent of the Atlantic Accord which provides that Newfoundland and Lab-
rador shall be the principal beneficiary of the development of its offshore
oil and gas resources.' °
Based on this statement, and regardless of the way the regulatory land-
scape may appear at first blush, it appears that the issue of provincial
benefits will continue to play a crucial role in project economics for the
foreseeable future in the Newfoundland offshore area.
40. Newfoundland Department of Mines and Energy, News Release, "Province Gives Go Ahead to
White Rose Development" (19 December 2001).
